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THE DIMENSIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY - A CANADIAN
APPROACH
Jonathan Fried
Permit me to set the stage by offering two possible definitions of sover-
eignty. One working hypothesis provided to us by the majority opinion in the
Austrian-German Customs Union case before the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice' is that sovereignty exists where a government has the sole
right of decision. Another view was offered by the minority, namely, that
sovereignty exists where a government has autonomy to exercise its own
judgment, including to accept restrictions on freedom of action, if the accep-
tance is freely given.
Under either definition in today's world, "sole source" decision-making is
impossible as a matter of global economic reality.. To take an obvious exam-
ple, no country acting alone can decide interest rates. Governments continue
to freely enter into binding treaty commitments to restrict their freedom of
action in their own self-interest. Thus, the question is not whether govern-
ments have lost their ability to make decisions alone, or to be left alone, but
rather the extent to which states retain the legal power of decision, the free-
dom to make their own judgments, and the freedom to "opt in" or "opt out"
from international rules that might be said to be imposed. I concluded in a
presentation here four years ago that sovereignty is, on this basis, alive and
well in today's world. But, something more fundamental may be happening.
Four years older and four years wiser, Henry King asked me to reflect
further on my earlier sanguine assessment of sovereignty. And indeed, a§ one
surveys today's landscape, one is tempted to adopt Joseph Heller's work and
* Jonathan Fried is the Assistant Deputy Minister for Trade and Economic Policy of
Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, with responsibility for
Canadian multilateral trade policy in the WTO, OECD, and various regional agreements, and
for ongoing implementation and administration of NAFTA. He received his B.A. and LL.B.
from the University of Toronto and his LL.M. from Columbia University. His remarks were
offered in his personal capacity, and do not necessarily reflect the views or position of the
Government of Canada.
I Customs Regime Between Germany and Austria, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 41.
2 See Jonathan Fried, Two Paradigms for the Rule of International Trade Law, 20 CAN.-
U.S. L. J. 39.
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say Something Happened;3 to some, Ray Bradbury's Something Wicked This4
Way Comes may be more apt.
In the trade field, with border issues largely addressed, the agenda is
moving increasingly inland. Today, in addition to tariff and related customs
issues, the trade agenda concerns such issues as standards, licensing and ap-
proval procedures, product and professional certifications, and, more
broadly, the regulatory framework. To take two examples, the TRIPs Agree-
ment sets out a comprehensive code for domestic law governing the grant,
administration, and enforcement of intellectual property rights; and the WTOS • 6
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications includes a "reference paper" on
regulatory principles to ensure that market access is not undermined by less
than competitive domestic regulation.
Our work in the Canadian and U.S. governments with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and countries affected by the current currency turmoil
in Asia carries a similar message. It is generally agreed that the free flow of
capital is not the cause of the problem. Rather, the problem is the fact that
adequate supervisory or regulatory frameworks may not have been in place
to oversee these flows. In some countries, the problem has been exacerbated
by less-than-transparent procedures for products and business approval.
As a result, our publics have begun to ask whether we have struck the
right balance. To some, it appears that the trade agenda is designed to free up
trade in goods and services and to ensure the free flow of capital at all costs.
Consumer and health groups ask whether the Sanitary/Phytosanitary (SPS)
Agreement7 has struck the right balance between avoiding unwarranted trade
restrictions, on the one hand, and maintaining the right to take precautionary
measures to ensure food safety on the other.
More fundamentally, political scientists would suggest that underlying
these concerns is a preoccupation about accountability, or what some have
termed a "democratic deficit." Arguments about loss of sovereignty may
reflect anxiety about the transparency and accountability of those in the posi-
tion of making decisions in areas where domestic governance directly im-
pacts international trade and investment.
3 JOSEPH HELLER, SOMETHING HAPPENED (Alfred A. Knopf, 1974).
4 RAY BRADBURY, SOMETHING WICKED THIS WAY CoMEs (Bantam Books, 1963).
5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 33
LL.M. 1223. One hundred and nineteen countries and territories are WTO Members and are,
therefore, Parties to TRIPS.
6 Agreement on Telecommunication Services (Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement
on Trade in Services), Feb. 15, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 354 (1997).
7 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
<http'//www.wto.org/goods/spsagr.htm> (visited June 11, 1998).
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The internationalization and universalization of human rights is exten-
sively documented. Without dwelling on an area so well reviewed by others,
and put most simply, it is just not credible for any government today to say
that basic treatment of citizens is solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction and
not of international concern. While as a formal matter, states may be free to
"opt into" international human rights instruments, as China has recently done
by signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,8 as a
practical matter, no state has the freedom to say that it chooses not to be
bound by basic human rights norms.
More broadly, the evolution of U.N. and regional peacekeeping and
peacebuilding activities, whether in Southeast Asia, the Balkans, sub-Saharan
Africa, or the Caribbean, may point to the overriding importance of collec-
tive security. Some commentators would conclude that neither humanitarian
intervention nor peacekeeping is any longer dependent on the consent of the
receiving state.
In yet another field, sovereignty and a nations-state's freedom to decide
seems to have become something of an anachronism. Climate change or
global warming, degradation of our oceans and atmosphere, and the risk of
nuclear accidents or spread of toxic chemicals are all manifestations of po-
tentially global environmental forces. From the Trail Smelter arbitration, to
Stockholm's Principle 21,10 to the emerging global commons, the sovereign
nation-state may no longer be free to decide to "opt out."
Some would go even further. In a seminal article in Foreign Affairs,
Power Shift," Jessica Matthews describes the rise of a global civil society,
the decline of states, and the rise of non-state actors, including the rapid
growth and influence of transnational non-governmental organization (NGO)
networks, the globalization and "de-nationalization" of business actors, on
the one hand, and the expansion of supranational institutions and authority,
on the other hand. She asks ".... whether there are new geographic or func-
tional entities that might grow up alongside the state, taking over some of its
powers and emotional resonance."
12
In a cogent reposte, Anne-Marie Slaughter argues in her article that,
"[t]he state is not disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts.
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 LL.M. 368
(1967).
United States v. Canada, Arbitral Tribunal, Montreal, Apr. 16, 1938 and Mar. 11, 1941;
U.N. REP. OF INT'L. ARBITRAL AWARDS 3 (1947) 1905.
10 Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, June 16, 1972, document 1.12, in GURUSWAMY ET AL., SUPPLEMENT OF
BASIC DOCUMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER.
" Jessica Matthews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF. 50 (Jan./Feb. 1997).
12 Id.
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These parts - courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures -
are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of rela-
tions that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order." 3 For her, this reality
has some benefits since, for example, judges are increasingly able to build a
global community of law. Regulators, through Basel, the International Or-
ganization of Securities Commissions (IOSCOS), or the International Asso-
ciation of Insurance Supervisors, can more effectively ensure prudential su-
pervision of global capital flows. More generally, "individuals and groups in
nondemocratic countries may also 'borrow' government institutions of
democratic states to achieve a measure of justice they cannot obtain in their
own countries."' 4 But, she cautions, "the prospect of transnational govern-
ment by judges and bureaucrats looks more like technocracy than democracy
... government institutions engaged in policy coordination with their foreign
counterparts will be barely visible, much less accountable, to voters still
largely tied to national territory."' 5 Worse still, Slaughter's scenario suggests
a fragmentation of international decision-making so extensive that there is no
avenue for articulating a community interest, national or international.
Yet, reports of the demise of the nation-state are exaggerated. My as-
sessment is different. In my view, the nation-state is still the central organiz-
ing vehicle for the voicing of claims and rights, the reconciliation and reso-
lution of competing claims through the legal process of rule-making, admini-
stration, and enforcement, and for the articulation of such interests. It is sig-
nificant to note that an extensive discussion of the democratic process of
balancing interests unfolded in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) in the context of addressing trade and environ-
ment disputes. Governments concluded that, in developing their national
approaches to trade and environmental disputes, they ". .. should recognize
the importance of taking into account, as appropriate, environmental, trade,
scientific, and other relevant expertise. Governments which have made third-
party interventions in trade disputes with environmental dimensions have
developed their positions through consultations among trade, environmental,
and other government officials and with interested NGOs. OECD govern-
ments which have been involved in such disputes have consulted a broad
range of expertise, including NGOs, in developing their national approaches
13 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF. 183 (Sept./Oct.
1997).
14 Id.
15 Id.
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and have taken steps to improve the ability of non-governmental actors to
obtain information on these disputes."
16
Thus, in each of the fields I have reviewed, trade, human rights, peace
and security, the environment, and even specialized regulation, it is still pri-
marily the nation-state government, today's sovereign, if you will, that, hav-
ing resolved competing interests domestically, is the spokesperson for such
interests at the international or transnational level. The nation-state judges
how its now-aggregated national interest is best reconciled with those of oth-
ers, determines appropriate forms of regulation, and much more often than
not, implements and enforces any such regulations or norms agreed upon
internationally. In fact, putting aside matters of international peace and secu-
rity, in virtually all other areas I have identified, namely, trade, environment,
and human rights, we see nation-states voluntarily coming together to for-
mulate internationally anchored norms, but leaving to the national level the
responsibility for both implementation and enforcement.
There are some current challenges. I do not mean to create a construct
that artificially describes a perfectly functioning international system of civil
societies acting internationally through the medium of nation-state coopera-
tion to create supranational norms that in turn are implemented and enforced
through national legal systems. Indeed, challenges abound.
First among these challenges is the articulation and the enforcement of
claimed community interests, or of interests perceived as so fundamental as
to require the development and the enforcement of norms in defense or ful-
fillment of these interests.
In the human rights field, many have welcomed the increasing reference
by national legislatures and courts to international norms. The Filartiga case
in the United States," in which a U.S. court assumed jurisdiction over a
crime committed by one foreigner against another outside the United States,
could be said to stand for the proposition that domestic courts can and should
identify and apply widely recognized treaty-based or customary international
human rights norms, in effect as agents for the international community, de-
spite the fact that under normal tests of jurisdiction, the authority exercised
by the court is extraterritorial in nature.
At the other extreme is the Helms-Burton law,18 which defenders explain
as merely giving U.S. authorities, in this case the Foreign Claims Commis-
sion, authority to interpret and apply well-recognized international standards
requiring prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for expropriations in
16 Report on Trade and Environment to the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, Doc.
OECD/GD (95) 63 at 34, OECD, Paris, 1995.
17 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980).
8 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6031-6046 (1996).
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violation of international law. It is seen by most, including Canada, as im-
posing a unilateral U.S. standard on the rest of the world in improper extra-
territorial fashion.
Accepting my premise that we do, and should continue to, rely on the in-
termediation of the nation-state to put into practical effect agreed-upon val-
ues, where should the line be drawn between domestic, legislative, regula-
tory, or judicial acts that do reflect international consensus and such acts that,
although ostensibly reflecting community values, are in reality the unilateral
extrapolation of purely domestic values onto others?
The second challenge is a corollary of the first. Assuming that a nation-
state chooses to promulgate what might be considered to be a unilateral stan-
dard, is there a distinction to be drawn between the conduct sought to be
regulated and the tools used as sanctions or remedies in respect of that con-
duct? For example, in the late 1980s, Toshiba Corporation was found to have
permitted the re-export of a "silent propeller" from Japan through Norway to
a country that posed a security risk. Under U.S. law, Toshiba was not fined
or compelled to submit to U.S. jurisdiction. Instead, they were told that they
would no longer enjoy the privilege of being authorized to participate in U.S.
defense procurement. Is there anything wrong with a government deciding
for itself how it intends to conduct its internal purchasing within its own ter-
ritory, subject, of course, to applicable international rules, such as the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement?' 9 Or is there something that seems to
partake of the same odious unilateral imposition of standards abroad that
Helms-Burton represents? Is the difference one between directing primary
conduct, particularly in a manner that undermines the law and policy of the
place where the conduct occurs, and the remedy, in this case limited wholly
to U.S. territory?20
Allow me to offer some humble guidance. Thus far, I have identified
certain dimensions of the current sovereignty debate, and some challenges.
Are there any prescriptions? Permit me to offer only a few observations, and
possibly some guidance for other speakers and panels. I have suggested
elsewhere that it is, arguably, the lack of consensus on the substantive rules,
rather than on institutional and dispute settlement mechanisms, that may ac-
count for the seemingly widespread resistance to a supranational authority as
a threat to "sovereignty," particularly in the trade field.
19 Agreement on Government Procurement Measures <httpJ/www.wto.org/govt/
agree.htm> (visited June 11, 1998).
20 In the Bank of Nova Scotia case, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Bank of Nova Scotia,
740 F.2d 817(1 1h Cir. 1984), cert. deinied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985), Canada objected strongly to
the Hobson's choice presented to the Bank of being free to choose to do business in the
Caribbean or the United States.
21 See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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Many disputes in North America concern areas unregulated by interna-
tional trade rules or governed by rules too general and rudimentary in scope
to provide effective discipline (such as agricultural trade), or areas where in
the absence of internationally agreed upon rules, one or another country
(usually the United States) has sought to legislate, adjudicate, and enforce
domestically acts abroad that either have "effects" within the territory or af-
fect "vital" national interests.
It seems that, in areas unregulated or modestly regulated by international
norms, a greater degree of "sovereignty" or "independence" in decision-
making remains. In these circumstances, however, in the absence of interna-
tional agreement on the substantive norms to be applied, disputes center in-
stead on the propriety of unilateral enforcement. Put more simply, the ques-
tion becomes whether access to the U.S. market is, or should be, a reward for
"good" behavior, as determined by the United States. For example, the cur-
rent debate regarding most-favored nation (MFN) treatment for China in the
light of human rights violations involves the question of withholding non-
GATT-bound preferences. In the area of export controls, the 1988 Omnibus
Trade Bill's sanctions for export control violations are limited to access to
the U.S. defense procurement market," an area largely outside the coverage
of the GATT Procurement Agreement.2 And the Thai copyright and Brazil-
ian pharmaceuticals investigations, conducted under the auspices of Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974,24 each involved areas where the "target" gov-
ernment had, in the exercise of its sovereign authority, chosen not to sign on
to certain international standards.
Conversely, the best way to avoid the perils of unilateralism is to reach
agreement on the substantive rules. If, for example, we as a society believe
that corruption abroad is to be deterred, is legislation like the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act25 the most efficient way to achieve this objective, or will it lead
to difficult litigation surrounding extraterritorial jurisdiction, as occurred in26
the Kilpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics case that went to the U.S. Su-
preme Court?
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107..
2 See supra note 19.
24 Trade Act of 1974, Pub L. No. 93-618, §§301-09, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975), amended
by Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-19 (1988)).
2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 etseq.
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1980).
7
Fried: Dimensions of Sovereignty--A Canadian Approach, The
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1998
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
Is not our track record in achieving consensus both in the OECD27 and in
the Organization of American States28 on international conventions to com-
bat bribery and corruption, again implemented and enforced through national
laws,29 both more effective and more guaranteed to avoid problems of extra-
territorial jurisdiction?
Accordingly, the real question is how best to allocate the norm-creating
and enforcement responsibility among international, national, and sub-
national levels. Internationally agreed upon rules, enforced domestically, still
allow for a balanced relationship between international and national levels.
Not to belabor the point, but in an interdependent world, the nation-state can
properly be viewed as the executor of shared values. In the WTO TRIPS
Agreement, for example, members set out a reasonably comprehensive code
of intellectual property protection, and the remedies are authorized and
agreed upon. Implicitly, therefore, questions of institutional competence,
both national and international, are properly addressed.
The E.U. "subsidiarity" principle may provide a lesson of more general
application, one that encourages the development of international or supra-
national principles, while permitting national tailoring, subject to interna-
tional oversight. In fact, this principle is being applied in the international
trade regime as well, as under the SPS Agreement and Agreement on Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade (TBT), where national licensing and other adminis-
trative authorities are expected to adhere to domestic procedures that con-
form to, and implement, international rules.
A further lesson is that, where differences arise internationally, they
should be resolved at the international level. In the WTO, an elaborate but
effective international dispute settlement regime is available for settling dis-
putes about the internationally agreed upon norms. Disputes between indi-
viduals arising under these norms are settled through national courts and
agencies.
A third lesson would appear to be that, if the nation-state is and should
properly remain a central organizing principle, we should also recognize
some obligation on governments to ensure democratic decision-making and
processes for the reconciliation of interests domestically before they are ar-
ticulated by the state internationally.
27 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Council Revised
Recommendation c(97) 123/final on Combatting Bribery in International Business
Transactions, May 23, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1016 (1997).
Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
March 29, 1996, I.E.L.-VI-Z.
29 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 21; Offences Against the Administration of
Law and Justice, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, §§ 119-130.
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Taking the current trade agenda as an example, its focus on non-tariff
barriers, services, competition, investment, sound regulatory frameworks,
and transparency means that the new agenda is more about strengthening
markets and less about opening markets. The focus becomes the horizontal,
domestic agenda of regulatory reform, the promotion of non-corrupt gov-
ernments working to create a stable, predictable, transparent supervisory
structure (i.e., financial services regulation) that ultimately creates a stable
environment for investment. This agenda also has connections to other areas
of domestic regulation. Sound labor policies ensure stability. Sound envi-
ronmental policies avoid deforestation. Accordingly, this agenda necessarily
goes beyond the WTO and affects our thinking about the World Bank, the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the United Na-
tions Development Program, as well as the International Labor Organization
and various fora where environmental agreements are being pursued.
This agenda also has a significant development dimension, as we seek
ways to ensure the greater integration of developing economies into the
global trading system, as well as to provide support for Africa and the poor-
est countries committed to poverty reduction, economic reform, and good
governance.
Some would take this agenda one step further. White House adviser
Mack McLarty, in a recent speech, underlined the fact that "open markets
support open contemporary democracies" in calling for a second generation
of reforms addressing such matters as drugs, corruption, and other aspects of
the social infrastructure. I do not purport to offer as extensive a list of sub-
stantive reforms. More modestly, I am suggesting that basic legal process
values of transparency, due process, administrative and judicial review, and
freedoms essential to a functioning democracy are a necessary domestic ele-
ment of today's international system.
Both Dicean parliamentary democracy and Thomas Paine's republican
models are more than adequate to the task. I will, however, leave you with
one final question. If my sense of the evolution of norm-creation at the inter-
national level is correct, and if indeed in due course we will find an increas-
ing number of international decisions, whether via dispute settlement or by
treaty, in an increasing number of fields, we will need to address how our
two legal systems can absorb supranational decisions. This is a challenge
with which various European legal systems have had to come to grips in the
course of building the European Union, putting it against various constitu-
tional democracies on the foundation of accountability. But, neither Canada
or the United States has really yet had to ask how sovereign parliaments,
9
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sovereign legislatures, and independent judiciaries can reconcile themselves
to the international system.3°
30 See Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39
(1994); Jeffrey L. Friesen, The Distribution of Treaty-Implementing Powers in Constitutional
Federations: Thoughts on the American and Canadian Models, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 1415
(1994).
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